Lena Andersson, Rationality and me

In the Swedish contemporary discourse, some pundits can be accused of using emotions instead of using clear arguments, they are sometimes even called "irrational" and are referred to as persons who focus more on how something is said - and by whom - rather than on what is being said. Their counter-debaters, on the other hand, can every now and again be accused of being cold-hearted rationalists. The latter designation seems to affect the writer Lena Andersson who with her emphasis on objectivity, reason and rationality can appear square and non-empathetic. These conditions have made me think about rationality, what is it even?  
    First one might ask what rationality isn’t. Cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker, who wrote an entire book on the matter, argues that irrationality - that secular sin - emanate from motivated reasoning and what he calls myside bias. Motivated reasoning is the inclination to base conclusions on personal aims and emotions rather than on facts and evidence and Pinker seems to define myside bias as the habit of people to reason to conclusions that enhance the “correctness of their political, religious, ethnic, or cultural tribe”. These two phenomena sound slightly related to my biased mind. Philosopher and cognitive scientist Paul Thagard “explain the tendency of people to succumb to motivated reasoning [and myside bias] as the result of the tight integration of cognition and emotion in the brain. In general, this integration is beneficial because it keeps people’s thinking focused on what emotions indicate are important to their well-being. But integration causes problems when people’s motivations swamp their ability to draw conclusions based on good evidence. Other limitations of the brain that hinder rationality are its slowness and restricted size, along with imperfections in attention and consciousness.”  
    Different philosophers have different takes on rationality, and there are a wealth of takes to choose from. Pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty, for example, distinguish three different forms of rationality:  
 
1. Rationality – the ability to cope with the environment by adjusting one’s reactions to environmental stimuli in complex and delicate ways. Referred to as technical reason or simply survival skills. This one is ethically neutral.

2. Rationality – An extra ingredient human beings have and brutes do not. We can set goals other than mere survival: play football, eat candy, talk about dogs etc.

3. Rationality is roughly synonymous with tolerance – with the ability not to be overly disconcerted by differences from oneself and not to respond aggressively to such differences. This ability goes along with a willingness to alter one’s own habits – not only to get more of what one previously wanted but to shape oneself into a different sort of person, one who wants different things than before. It’s an inclination to talk things over rather than to fight, burn or banish. A virtue of living and letting live and to put together new, syncretic, compromise ways of life. Rationality in this sense is, according to Rorty, quasi-synonymous with freedom.  
      
    That third definition can be particularly difficult to live up to, I think, and it can seem like something you just say and don't mean when you express that you want a rational (tolerant) dialogue. Let us visit an imaginary cafe where two philosophers have the following exchange,  
- 'Rationality is often referred to as a kind of ability with which one tries to exhibit the universal validity of one's position,' says Philosopher 1.  
To which Philosopher 2 replies,  
- 'But what does universal validity have to do with me?'  
 
   Here there seems to be a split between public accountability – something that applies to everyone – and private self-creation and values and vocabularies. Can one trace the hope that there is such a universal validity to a hope that we can find within ourselves a strong ally in a metaphysical tribunal that decides the Truth with a capital t? Something eternal and Platonic? Philosopher 1 perhaps insists in a related way that man's main duty is "to know", "to usurp knowledge". Philosopher 2 then answers that "man has no main duty, it is up to each one of us to shape his own duty, but if I have to choose anyway, I choose love over knowledge".  
   The phrase "Love over knowledge” might sound too dopey to some ears, and is it a focus on knowledge rather than love and solidarity that distinguishes Lena Andersson from some of her detractors, for better or for worse? Insinuating question of course, but if we shift our attention and try to make a synthesis while we're at it and instead say "love at the same time as knowledge" then perhaps rationality becomes an attitude to discuss any subject - scientific, artistic or political - and to do it in a way that abstains from dogmatism, touchiness and self-righteous indignation. It is in this manner a spirit of openness rather than something hardheaded and exclusively scientific. Rationality is in this sense, as Rorty pointed out, “a criterionless muddling through". Sometimes Rorty can summarily write that "’method' and 'rationality' are names for a suitable balance between respect for the opinions of one's fellows and respect for the stubborness of sensation”. What would Lena Andersson say about this? Would she say something about us using our reason to seek the truth (and to access eternal platonic forms) and that we must be clear and rigorous in our language?  
    Concerning language, the later Wittgenstein claimed that "Language has no downtown", it has no core or essence or a singular language game that rise above the rest. Robert B Brandom, on the contrary, insists that language has such a center, namely the game of giving and asking for reasons, the social practice of assessing the claims of others and trying to justify what we say. In any case we might endeavor to claim that language strengthens our ability to make reasonable inferences and can thus be said to have a clear link to what is usually called rationality. In addition to these premises, one can imagine that we humans in our interactions with each other are served by the principle of charity, which means that we try to interpret a speaker's statements in the most rational way possible, we do not "intentionally misinterpret" - except maybe on twitter -  and we try to make sense of what the speaker says and interpret in a way that optimizes the possibility of agreement. This sort of chimes with the idea of rationality as "roughly synonymous with tolerance".  
    I return for a moment to Pinker and the question that popped up: Have I written all this under the influence of motivated reasoning and myside bias? It is highly likely. For sure, I can never reach a neutral stand point or a God’s eye view and the state of affairs might be, as Hilary Putnam asserted, that “there is no neutral conception of rationality when rationality itself is what is at issue”. 
    I would like to conclude with philosophers 1 and 2 at the cafe, where the former spoke of universal validity and the latter wondered "what does that have to do with me?". They are like a split between public and private, between facts and values, and objectivity and intersubjectivity and they may never come to an agreement, they cannot reach synthesis but possibly compromises. Perhaps we must metaphorically carry these two philosophers within us and harbor their contradictions. But in the best of worlds, they stick to the dialogue in any case, they don't resort to violence and don't step outside the conversation, they stick to the plight of the game, "the game of giving and asking for reasons". They are rational to some extent, but still a philosopher of Rorty's kind can spoil the party and remark "reason only works within the limits imagination has set". If we follow Rorty here the implication will be that a rational culture is one where the inhabitants have a strong imagination - they can "upgrade rationality" so to speak - and to attain such abilities we shall have to look for ways of enriching our imagination and attentiveness through a greater cultural input, and output, of stories and narratives in whatever format we can dream up. Werner Herzog's advice springs to mind: " read, read, read, read".  In a sense being rational is about expanding the scope of the conversation, and we might do this in novel, previously unheard of ways which at first glance can seem downright irrational. And when it comes to the historical struggles for universal suffrage or a decent living wage then demonstrations, strikes and protests - some extra-conversational actions - might be the only rational thing to do. Perhaps this is what Hegel meant with reason working itself out in history?  

 
 

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